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INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with the working-level dispute-settlement appara-
tus of the World Trade Organization ("WTO,,).l In particular, it discusses 
* C.Y. Starr Professor of Law, New York Law School; Of Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, 
Steen & Hamilton. 
I. Following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the WTO was created as from 
January I, 1995 by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
vol. I (1994),33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) and the agreements annexed thereto and incorporated 
therein, three of which are particularly relevant to this article: the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex lA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. I (1994),33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. IS, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex lA, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agree-
ment]; and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
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the work of the Appellate Body and, functioning below it, panels estab-
lished by the WTO to conduct proceedings in individual cases.2 It 
focuses on the relationship between the Appellate Body and panels, and 
on the responsibilities of the Appellate Body in the context of that rela-
tionship. 
This article's principal point of departure in examining that relation-
ship is the WTO case known as the Asbestos case, in which a WTO panel 
issued a report in November 2000,) and the Appellate Body issued a re-
port in March 2001.4 The case attracted considerable attention because it 
took place against a background of criticism by some commentators of 
the way in which the WTO has balanced the policy of fostering multilat-
eral trade against non-trade policies involving, for example, the 
environment, health, and the treatment of workers.5 These policy issues 
are not the main focus of this article, however, in part because it concen-
trates on the relationship between the Appellate Body and WTO panels 
as such, and in part because, in any event, the mandate and resources of 
the WTO limit its authority outside the area of multilateral trade. 
A brief introductory summary seems in order concerning the Appel-
late Body and WTO panels. Under the old GATT,6 the predecessor to the 
WTO, dispute settlement was handled by panels, and their creation and 
reports were subject to confirmation by all of the GATT member coun-
ROUND vol. 31 (1994),33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding 
or DSUj. As of Jan. 1,2002, the WTO had 144 members, and some 30 additional countries 
were seeking membership. 
2. See DSU. See also GABRIELLE MARCEAU & PETER MORRISON, WORLD TRADE OR-
GANIZATION, THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: A COLLECTION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS, WTOIOMC/1995-03 (1995); DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1999); 
James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body, 50 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 248 (200 I). Panels are appointed pursuant to Articles 6 
and 8 of the DSU. The Appellate Body has seven members appointed by the members of the 
WTO acting for the Dispute Settlement Body pursuant to Article 17. 
3. Rapport du Groupe special, Communautes Europeennes-mesures affectant 
I'amiante et les produits en contenant, WT/DSI35/R (Sept. 18,2000), http://www.wto.org 
[hereinafter Asbestos Panel report]. 
4. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), http://www.wto.org 
[hereinafter Appellate Body Asbestos report]. The seven-member Appellate Body acted in this 
case through a three-member Division composed of Messrs. Feliciano, Bacchus, and Ehler-
mann (the "AB Division"). 
5. See, e.g., the commentaries collected in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001); Jenny Bates & Greg Principato, 
Progressive Policy Institute, A Third Way on Trade and Globalization (July 18, 2000), at 
http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid= 1499; Steve Charnovitz, Progressive Pol-
icy Institute, Addressing Environmental and Labor Issues in the World Trade Organization 
(Nov. I, 1999), at http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=649. 
6. General Agreemcnt on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-II, T.I.A.S. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hcrcinafter GATT 1947]. 
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tries, with the result that on occasion panel proceedings were blocked or 
panel reports failed to come into effect.7 When the WTO came into being 
in 1995, the old GATT procedures were changed in several significant 
ways, of which two will be mentioned. 
First, the Appellate Body was added, and countries that bring dis-
putes before WTO panels have been given the right to appeal to the 
Appellate Body on issues of law or legal interpretations covered by or 
expressed in panel reports. Although the relevant written procedures 
seem to assume that WTO dispute settlement will be primarily the work 
of panels, with occasional resort to the Appellate Body on points of law, 
in practice the Appellate Body has become deeply involved in the han-
dling of many disputes, and in a number of instances has issued reports 
that "complete the analysis" of, or otherwise rework in some detail, re-
ports issued by panels.s 
Second, there is no effective appeal from a report issued by the Ap-
pellate Body. It has no power of remand, and thus it cannot rule on a 
point of law in a case and then send the case back to a panel for further 
proceedings. More importantly, a report by the Appellate Body auto-
matically comes into effect unless it is rejected by a unanimous vote of 
the WTO member-countries (sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body).9 
Since at least the country benefiting from an Appellate Body report can 
be expected to vote in favor of the report, the practical result is that every 
report by the Appellate Body automatically comes into effect and is not 
subject to further review. 
The Appellate Body is thus vested with considerable power, espe-
cially in the context of its relationship with individual panels whose 
reports it receives on appeal. If, in the opinion of the Appellate Body, a 
panel has committed error on a point of law in a particular case, the case 
7. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 1-18. 
8. Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the DSU, the member countries of the WTO "affirm their 
adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied" under GATT 
1947, which refers in large part to the use of panels before the creation of the Appellate Body 
in the WTO. Eleven articles of the DSU (Articles 6 through 16) and a 12-section appendix 
thereto (Appendix 3) are devoted to panels. One article (Article 17) is devoted to the Appellate 
Body. The next two articles (Articles 18 and 19) are common to communications with and 
recommendations by both panels and the Appellate Body. On the development of the tech-
nique whereby the Appellate Body "completes the analysis" of a panel, see Sydney M. Cone 
III, The Appellate Body, the Protection of Sea Turtles, and the Technique of "Completing the 
Analysis," J. WORLD TRADE, April 1999, at 51, 56-61 (1999) [hereinafter Completing the 
Analysis). See also Cone, The Appellate Body and Harrowsmith Country Life, J. WORLD 
TRADE, April 1998, at 103, 113-15 [hereinafter Harrowsmith]. 
9. DSU Art. 2.4, 20. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 61-62, 153-60; 
Completing the Analysis, supra note 8, at 59. Between the establishment of the WTO in 1995 
and September 200 I, over 225 complaints were filed with the WTO, and over 50 reports by 
panels or the Appellate Body were adopted pursuant to the DSU. 
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will not go back to the panel for further proceedings. If the Appellate 
Body rejects a panel's analysis of facts and law and proceeds to "com-
plete the analysis" in a different manner from that employed by the 
panel, the analysis thus completed is not, as a practical matter, subject to 
review by anyone, and there is no opportunity for a further weighing of 
the work of the panel as against that of the Appellate Body. This means 
that, in any given case, the Appellate Body, as a practical matter, has ul-
timate and definitive authority to determine the proper scope and content 
of changes to, or rejections of, a panel's analysis carried out by the Ap-
pellate Body in order to "complete the analysis" of the panel or 
otherwise to dispose of the panel's report. 10 
The considerable power of the Appellate Body just described means 
that it is in a position to act as the judicial suzerain of the WTO in indi-
vidual cases-a position having important implications for the 
jurisprudence and the judicial administration of the WTO. It is these im-
plications which provide the focus of this article. The Appellate Body, in 
the area of formulating WTO jurisprudence, develops the fundamental 
framework for decisionmaking by future panels in future cases. More 
generally, the Appellate Body is uniquely situated to provide administra-
tive leadership that, properly exercised, will give coherence and 
effectiveness to panels and the Appellate Body acting as the judiciary of 
the WTO. It seems appropriate to consider whether, in these areas, the 
relationship between the Appellate Body and panels might be the subject 
of constructive reconsideration. 
Reconsideration of the manner in which the Appellate Body disposes 
of the work of various panels in various cases raises the following types 
of questions. Are the Appellate Body and panels acting in concert in a 
shared judicial endeavor? Is their relationship informed by the common 
goals of handling cases efficiently, achieving judicial economy, and 
minimizing disharmony in the development of WTO jurisprudence? Is 
adequate attention given to the impact of individual decisions on the dis-
position of future cases? Where on a potential spectrum should panel 
reports be located between, for example, being considered as the work-
product of clerks, to be marked up or discarded without inhibition, and 
being treated as potential sources of substantive value and as integral to a 
single procedural continuum? 
The concerns raised by these questions seem to be illustrated in an 
instructive manner by the Asbestos case. It was not a run-of-the-mill 
trade case, but one that required rulings in several key areas of the law 
governing multilateral trade. Because the case was being followed by 
constituencies both within and outside the WTO-constituencies con-
10. See Completing the Analysis, supra note 8, at 60-61. 
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cerned with the promotion of multilateral trade by the WTO, and con-
stituencies concerned that competing, non-trade policy objectives do not 
receive adequate attention within the WTOII-the case tested the capac-
ity of the WTO's working-level dispute-settlement apparatus to reach 
decisions in a disciplined manner having due regard for the long-term, 
judicious development of WTO case law. Thus, in the context of the As-
bestos case, this article will first outline the case, will next set out the 
issues in the case of relevance both to the substance of the case and the 
questions mentioned above, and will then proceed to analyze those is-
sues. 
A. The Asbestos Case 
The case was brought by Canada against the European Union (the 
"EU") acting on behalf of France. 12 Canada challenged a French decree 
that came into effect in January 1997 and that, in substantial part, banned 
the importation of products containing chrysotile asbestos.13 Theretofore, 
the leading exporter of those products had been Canada and, more 
exactly, Quebec. 14 Their exportation was of economic importance to 
Quebec, and of political importance to Canada in light of relations 
between French- and English-speaking Canada. IS The prohibitions in the 
French decree were grounded in the carcinogenic characteristics of 
II. Examples of non-trade-group interest in. and comments on. the Asbestos case are 
found in Daniel Pruzin, WTO Delays Releasing Decision in Complaint by Canada Against 
France's Ban on Asbestos, 17 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), No. II, at 433 (2000); Daniel Pruzin & 
Peter Menyasz, Environment: Environmental Groups Criticize WTO Ruling on Asbestos Ban, 
171nt'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 37, at 1432 (Sept. 21, 2000); Daniel Pruzin & Peter Menyasz, 
WTO Appellate Body Upholds French Ban on Asbestos Imports, 18 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), 
No. II, at 426 (Mar. 15,2001); Michael M. Weinstein, Greens and Globalization: Declaring 
Defeat in the Face of Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 18; Founda-
tion for International Environmental Law and Development, on its behalf and on behalf of Ban 
Asbestos (International and Virtual) Network, Greenpeace International, International Ban 
Asbestos Secretariat, World Wide Fund for Nature, International. Letter and loint Amicus 
Brief in European Communities-Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Feb. 6, 2001, 
available at http://www.field.org.ukJpapers/pdf/asbestosamicus.pdf; Danielle Knight, Inter 
Press Service, Trade-Health: WTO Ruling Reveals Toxic Logic, Warn Groups (Sept. 19, 2000), 
available at http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/septOOIl6_19_062.html[hereinafter. collectively, 
NGO Commentaries]. 
12. The European Communities had joined the WTO, and the European Communities (in 
the singular) was the party against which Canada brought its complaint. This article uses the 
more familiar contemporary appellation, European Union or EU, rather than European Com-
munities or EC. 
13. Decree No. 96-1133 of Dec. 24, 1996,1.0., Dec. 26, 1996, p. 19126; lCP 1997, Ill, 
68259 [hereinafter French decree]. 
14. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, ~ 3.20. 
15. See Bill Schiller, WTO Rejects Canada's Case on Asbestos. TORONTO STAR, Sept. 19, 
2000, at E3. 
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chrysotile asbestos.' 6 These prohibitions applied to asbestos products of 
domestic and foreign origin and did not single out products originating 
in Canada (or Quebec).'7 
Among the issues raised by the case were questions concerning the 
national treatment of imported products, non-tariff barriers to imported 
products, the protection of public health, and technical barriers to trade. IS 
The first three arose under a WTO agreement known as GATT 1994, the 
fourth under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the 
"TBT Agreement"). The issue of national treatment is governed by para-
graph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 ("Article 1lI:4"). The issue of non-
tariff barriers is governed by Article XI of GATT 1994 ("Article XI"). 
Public health is expressly mentioned in GATT 1994's Article XX, enti-
tled "General Exceptions;" paragraph (b) of Article XX ("Article 
XX(b)") relates to "measures" "necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.,,'9 
In general form, the case followed a familiar pattern in disputes 
brought before panels under the old GATT and, in recent years, pursuant 
to the WTO dispute-settlement procedures. Canada, the complaining 
party, alleged (among other things) violations of Article 1Il:4, Article XI, 
and the TBT Agreement. France (meaning the EU acting on behalf of 
France), the defending party, responded with both denials and a justifica-
tion; that is, France both offered reasoned denials of the allegations, and 
additionally (as regards the alleged GATT 1994 violations) justified its 
decree as falling under one of the General Exceptions as set out in Arti-
cle XX(b).20 
The WTO panel that considered the Asbestos case found a violation 
of Article 1lI:4, therefore found it unnecessary to consider Article XI, 
and then proceeded to consider Article XX(b). It ruled that, notwith-
standing the violation of Article I1I:4, the French decree was authorized 
by Article XX(b).21 In other words, Canada lost, and France won on the 
ground that the French decree was a measure necessary to protect human 
16. Information concerning the danger to health posed by chrysotile asbestos is found in 
the Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, particularly at 'lI 5 and in the Addendum thereto, 
WT/OS I 35/RiAdd. I , http://www.wto.org. 
17. See French decree, supra note 13; Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'lI 8.224. 
18. In addition to the claims under Articles I1I:4 and XI (and the related arguments under 
Article XX (b)) and the claim under the TBT Agreement, Canada made a claim under Article 
XXIII (I )(b) of GATT 1994 to the effect that, even if the French decree did not constitute a 
violation of GATT 1994, it constituted a non-violation nullification or impairment of Canada's 
legitimate trade expectations. This claim was viewed as meritorious by neither the panel nor 
the Appellate Body, and in the interest of brevity is not examined in this article. Asbestos 
Panel report, supra note 3, 'lI 8.304; Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 'lI 191. 
19. GATT 1994 Art. XX(b). 
20. See Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'lI'l1 8.3-.8. 
21. See id. 'lI'l18.144, 8.159, 8.241. 
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life or health from the carcinogenic threat of chrysotile asbestos prod-
ucts. As for the TBT Agreement, the panel found it inapplicable in the 
present case.22 On its face, then, not only did the case follow a familiar 
pattern of complaint, denials, and justification found in GATTIWTO 
case law, but also the panel's disposition of the case was consonant with 
that familiar pattern. In disposing of the case, the panel unequivocally 
permitted France to justify an exclusion of imports on grounds of public 
health. 
Even so, advocates of environmental and public-health policies ob-
jected to the panel's finding that the French prohibition of imports 
violated Article I1I:4, and to a procedure that seemingly compelled 
France to justify that prohibition under Article XX (b)-a procedure, it 
was claimed, that put an undue burden on the party seeking to protect 
public health from a carcinogenic product.D These reactions to the panel 
report raised questions as to the interpretation of Article 1II:4, and as to 
the proper burden of proof allocable to parties in WTO disputes. 
On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding of a vio-
lation of Article 111:4,24 thus making academic the panel's finding that the 
violation was justified under Article XX(b). Nevertheless, the Appellate 
Body provided its own analysis of Article XX(b), concluding (as had the 
panel) that, under Article XX(b), the French prohibition on imports was 
justified.25 It is significant that under the approach taken by the Appellate 
Body, the justification was academic, because the Appellate Body had 
decided that there was no Article I1I:4 violation in need of justification. 
Like the panel, the Appellate Body declined to rule on Canada's claim 
under Article XI,26 which meant that neither the panel nor the Appellate 
Body considered whether the French decree imposed a non-tariff barrier 
inconsistent with Article XI as claimed by Canada. In the case of the 
Appellate Body, Canada's claim of an Article XI violation was no longer 
clearly redundant, because the Appellate Body, unlike the panel, had 
found that there was no violation of Article I1I:4. While the Appellate 
Body did not say so, its views on Article XX (b) presumably meant that, 
had it been found that the French decree constituted a violation of Article 
XI, the violation would have been justified on public-health grounds un-
der Article XX(b). As for the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body 
reversed the panel's finding that that Agreement was not relevant to the 
22. See id. 'llS.73. 
23. See NGO Commentaries, supra note II. 
24. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 'll14S. 
25. ld.'ll'll155-75. 
26. The Appellate Body report mentions Canada's Article XI claim, but does not discuss 
it.ld. 'll'll3, 5. 
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present case, but declined to rule one way or the other on how the TBT 
Agreement should be applied to the case.27 
B. Certain Issues Raised by the Asbestos Case 
In the following description, more detailed attention will be given to 
the issues raised by the Asbestos case in respect of (1) Article I1I:4, (2) 
Article XI, (3) Article XX(b), and (4) the TBT Agreement. The follow-
ing description is based on the original panel report (which, involving as 
it does a dispute between Quebec and France, is in French), and on the 
report of the Appellate Body (which is in English). 
1. Article III:4-"Like Products" 
For present purposes, the relevant provisions in Article III of GATT 
1994 are paragraphs 1,2, and 4-"Article III: I ," "Article III:2," and "Ar-
ticle III:4"-and a supplementary provision found in Annex I to GATT 
1994 relating to Article III:2 ("Ad Article JII:2"). Article III: I, which is 
said to inform all of Article III, states that internal taxes and other inter-
nal regulations "should not be applied to imported or domestic products 
so as to afford protection to domestic production.,,28 
Article 111:2, which deals with internal taxes, has three parts. The 
first sentence states that imported products shall not be subject to inter-
nal taxes in excess of those applied to "like domestic products." The 
second sentence, which is drafted as an addition to the first, incorporates 
Article III: I, thereby forbidding internal taxes that "afford protection to 
domestic production." Ad Article IlI:2 clarifies the difference between 
the first and second sentences, and states that a tax conforming to the 
requirements of the first sentence is not consistent with the second sen-
tence when there is a taxed product and "a directly competitive or 
substitutable product which [is] not similarly taxed." Article III:2's two 
sentences thus contain two prohibitions. One forbids taxes on imports in 
excess of taxes on "like domestic products." The other forbids taxes on 
imports when "directly competitive or substitutable" domestic products 
are not similarly taxed. These two sentences have been construed to 
mean that "like products" constitute a narrower category than "directly 
competitive or substitutable products"; that any tax differential whatever 
between "like products" is suspect; but that a de minimis tax differential 
would not constitute a violation of the second sentence. Put differently, 
27. [d. 9191 59-83. 
28. The view that this principle in Article Ill: I informs all of Article III is found under 
"G. Article III: I" in the Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8, 10, 11/ AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), at 17-18, http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Alcoholic 
Beverages easel. 
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any tax discrimination between "like products" may violate the first sen-
tence, but "like products" for this purpose is a relatively narrow concept. 
On the other hand, while minimal discrimination may not violate the 
second sentence, "directly competitive or substitutable products" is a 
relatively broad concept.29 
The Asbestos case involved a claim by Canada not under Article 
1II:2 (just discussed) but under Article 1Il:4. This provision requires that 
imported products 
shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.30 
As can be seen, Article 111:4 uses the term "like products" that has 
already appeared in Article III:2, but uses only that term and (in contrast 
to Article III:2) does not refer to the additional concept of "directly com-
petitive or substitutable products." In the Asbestos case, as in other cases, 
the use of "like products" in one way in Article I1I:2 and in another way 
in Article 111:4 can raise questions of interpretation. These questions are 
examined further on in this discussion. 
Canada's "like products" claim under the Article I1I:4 provision 
quoted above was to the effect that, while the French decree forbade the 
sale of chrysotile asbestos products in France, it did not forbid the sale in 
France of other, non-asbestos products which were "like" the asbestos 
products. These other products, briefly, were derived not from chrysotile 
asbestos fibers but from polyvinyl alcohol fibers, cellulose fibers, or 
glass fibers. These non-asbestos-based products will be referred to as 
"substitute products." The Canadian claim, then, was that asbestos-based 
products and substitute products were "like products" but that, pursuant 
to the French decree and in violation of Article 111:4, asbestos-based 
products were accorded treatment less favorable than that accorded to 
b . d 11 su stltute pro ucts.-
The panel found that asbestos-based and substitute products were 
"like products;" that, pursuant to the French decree, the former had been 
accorded less favorable treatment than the latter; and that the French de-
cree therefore violated Article I1I:4. To determine whether the two 
categories of product were "like" for purposes of Article I1I:4, the panel 
relied to a substantial extent on a report issued by the Appellate Body in 
29. An extensive discussion of these concepts is found under "H. Article III:2" in the AI· 
coholic Beverages case. Id. at 18-31. 
30. GATT 1994 Art. III:4. 
31. For the Canadian claim under Article 111:4, see the Asbestos Panel report, supra note 
3, 'Il'll8.101-.IS8. 
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September 1996 in a case known as Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (the 
"Alcoholic Beverages case,,).32 
The Alcoholic Beverages case arose under Article III:2 (not I1I:4); it 
involved taxes imposed by Japan on imported and domestic alcoholic 
beverages. The level of taxation was higher for imported than for domes-
tic beverages. The key issue was whether the imported and domestic 
beverages were "like products" within the meaning of the first sentence 
of Article I1I:2, or "directly competitive or substitutable products" within 
the meaning of the second sentence of Article III:2. Substantially all of 
the products in question were found to be either "like" or "directly com-
petitive or substitutable," with the result that the tax regime was found to 
be in violation of Article 1Il:2.33 
In the Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body had affirmed 
the rejection by the panel in that case of an "aim and effects" test pro-
posed by the United States and Japan to give meaning to the concept of 
"like products" in Article III. Under this test, had it been adopted, a vio-
lation of Article 1II:2 or Article 111:4 would depend on whether measures 
discriminating between imported and domestic products had as their 
purpose and as their trade effects the protection of the domestic products 
against the imported products. 34 Rather than adopt this approach, the Ap-
pellate Body had endorsed four criteria for determining whether 
products are "like products." These four criteria can be summarized as 
follows: (I) the physical properties of the products; (2) the extent to 
which the products are susceptible of serving the same or similar end-
uses; (3) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products 
as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy 
a particular want or demand; and (4) the international tariff classification 
of the products.35 
The panel in the Asbestos case used these four criteria as a frame-
work for analyzing the question of whether, under Article IlI:4, asbestos 
products and substitute products are "like products.",6 The panel read 
Alcoholic Beverages as giving panels an element of discretion ("un ele-
ment de jugement discretionnaire") in applying the four criteria. 37 The 
Appellate Body, the panel said, had accorded flexibility to panels in ex-
amining the question of likeness ("dans leur examen du principe de 
32. See id. '11'11 8.112-.114; Alcoholic Beverages case, supra note 28. 
33. See Alcoholic Beverages case, supra note 28, at 31-32 ("I. Conclusions and Recom-
mendations"). 
34. See Robert E. Hudec, GATTIWTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem/or 
an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 626-28 (1998). 
35. See Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 'II 101. 
36. Asbestos Panel report. supra note 3. '11'11 8.113-.150. 
37. /d.'118.114. 
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similarite,,).38 The Asbestos panel decided that the four criteria were sub-
stantially interdependent, and that it was not appropriate to examine each 
of them in isolation from the others.J9 In relying on Alcoholic Beverages, 
an Article 111:2 case, the panel in effect merged the Article III:2 concepts 
of "like products" and "competitive or substitutable products," taken to-
gether, to arrive at a broad meaning of "like products" for purposes of 
Article III:4.40 The panel thus rejected an "extremely narrow" definition 
of "like products" for purposes of Article 111:4, and said that, for prod-
ucts to be "like" under Article 1II:4, it suffices that, for a given usage, the 
properties of the products be the same to the point that one product can 
replace another. ("11 suffit que, dans une utilisation donnee, les proprietes 
soient les memes au point qu'un produit puisse remplacer I'autre."t 
The Asbestos panel thus emphasized the second of the four Alco-
holic Beverages critieria: the extent to which products, claimed to be 
"like," are susceptible of serving the same or similar end-uses. The 
panel's treatment of the other three criteria was less detailed. Having 
analyzed the end-uses criterion as such, it analyzed the physical-
properties criterion to a large extent (but not exclusively) in terms of 
end-uses. The panel was of the view that consumer preferences were not 
a reliable criterion in the present case; and it attached little importance to 
the matter of tariff classification, which differed for fibers but not for 
certain fiber-based products.42 
The EU (on behalf of France) had urged the panel to take the car-
cinogenic characteristics of chrysotile asbestos into account when 
determining "likeness" on the basis of the physical-properties criterion. 
The argument was that toxicity was one of the physical characteristics of 
asbestos products and substitute products that was relevant to an appre-
ciation of their "likeness." The toxicity of asbestos products, the EU 
argued, renders them physically unlike substitute products. ("Un produit 
dangereux doit etre considere comme presentant une nature et une 
qualite differentes d'un produit non dangereux ou moins dangereux."t 
38. Id. 'II 8.123. 
39. Id. '118.115. 
40. In id. 'II 8.124, the panel cited the common consideration of the products in Report of 
the Panel, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alco-
holic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 116-17 (1987), irrespective of 
whether they had been found "like products" or "competitive or substitutable products" in 
Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 27, at 32, and referred to them as a group as "like products" 
("produits similaires au sens de l'article III:2"), adding that that case supported the panel's 
approach under Article IIl:4 CNous estimons que ce rapport confirme notre approche ... dans 
Ie cadre de l'article 111:4 .... "). 
41. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'II 8.124. 
42. See id. 'II'll 8.117-.150. 
43. Id. 'II 8.1 19. 
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The panel rejected the EU argument, however, and declined to take 
health considerations into account in determining "likeness" for pur-
poses of Article 111:4.44 
The panel expressed three reasons for refusing to consider toxicity as 
relevant to physical properties in the context of "like products" under 
Article IlI:4. The panel observed that in no previous WTO case had rela-
tive toxicity been considered a relevant physical characteristic for the 
purpose of determining whether different products are "like products.,,45 
(Here, although the panel understandably did not make the point, it 
might be observed that in the Alcoholic Beverages case, where the Ap-
pellate Body endorsed the four criteria for jUdging "likeness" in a case 
involving toxic products, it was not claimed that different levels of taxa-
tion of imported and domestic alcoholic products might be legitimately 
tied to different levels of toxicity.) 
In addition, the panel stated that, for the purpose of applying the 
physical-properties criterion under Article 111:4, the point at which 
physical properties should be taken into account is that moment at which 
asbestos products and substitute products may be interchangeably put to 
the same end-use. ("C'est ce moment-Ia qui nous interesse, celui ou elles 
sont utilisees a la meme fin.,,)46 
Finally, the panel was of the view that the very structure of the rele-
vant multilateral trade agreement, namely, GATT 1994, dictated that a 
matter of public health, here, the toxicity of asbestos products as com-
pared to substitute products, be determined not in the context of Article 
111:4, but in the context of Article XX(b), which deals expressly with the 
subject of measures necessary to protect human health or life. The panel 
said that it was reasoning in terms of the efficient allocation of subject-
matter within the structure of GATT 1994 Cia raison vient a notre avis 
de I' economie du GATT de 1994"), pursuant to which, the panel ob-
served, the substantive provisions relating to issues of public health are 
found in Article XX(b).47 
On appeal, the Appellate Body rejected the panel's view that the 
relative consequences for public health of asbestos products and substi-
tute products should not be taken into account in determining whether 
they are "like products" for purposes of Article III:4. To reach the con-
clusion that "likeness" or "unlikeness" can be determined under Article 
111:4 on the basis of relative toxicity, the Appellate Body had to deal with 
several issues, including: (a) whether such a determination improperly 
44. Id. 91'11 8.130-.132. 
45. Id. 'II 8.129. 
46. Id. 'II 8.125. 
47.ld.91918.129-.132. 
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intrudes on the intended purpose for which Article XX (b) was included 
in GATT 1994; (b) the scope of "like products" in Article I1I:4; (c) the 
application to asbestos products and substitute products of the four crite-
ria of "likeness" found in the Alcoholic Beverages case; and (d) the 
allocation of the burden of proof under Articles III:4 and XX(b). 
a. Respecting the Intended Purpose of Article XX(b) 
The Appellate Body said that Article III:4 should not be restricted 
"simply because Article XX(b) exists and may be available to justify 
measures inconsistent with Article I1I:4." According to the Appellate 
Body, the fact that using Article 1II:4 "implies a less frequent recourse to 
Article XX (b)" does not deprive the latter of its utility. Evidence relating 
to health risks, the Appellate Body said (in italics) is relevant under Arti-
cle 111:4 to "the competitive relationship in the marketplace" of allegedly 
"like" products, while the same evidence under Article XX(b) can be 
invoked to justify a "WTO-inconsistent measure on the grounds of hu-
man health.,,48 
The Appellate Body thus reasoned that evidence relating to human 
health, when it bears on competitive relationships in the marketplace, 
can be considered under Article 1II:4 in making a determination as to 
"like products." In this manner, the Appellate Body rejected the reason-
ing of the panel to the effect that the very structure of GATT 1994 
requires that measures adopted to protect human health should be evalu-
ated solely under Article XX(b). 
b. "Like Products" in Article I1I:4 
In substance, although not in language, the Appellate Body adopted 
the panel's view of the scope of "like products" for purposes of Article 
I1I:4. The panel had simply drafted its report as though "like products" in 
Article 1Il:4 equals the sum of "like products" and "directly competitive 
or substitutable products" in, respectively, the first and second sentences 
of Article I1I:2. To reach substantially the same result, the Appellate 
Body referred to its image in earlier cases comparing the term "like 
products" to an accordion which stretches or contracts in different places 
in GATT 1994; declined "to define the precise scope of the word 'like' in 
Article I1I:4"; yet reached two conclusions--one being that "like" is 
broader in Article I1I:4 than in the first sentence of Article III:2, the other 
(buttressed by three italicized words) being that "like" in Article IlI:4 is 
"not broader than the combined product scope of the two sentences of 
Article III:2.,,49 
48. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 'llIIS. 
49. [d. '11'll96-99. 
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c. Applying the Four Criteria of "Likeness" 
The key question for the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case was 
whether asbestos products and substitute products are "like products." 
The panel, applying the four criteria of "likeness" in the Alcoholic Bev-
erages case, had answered the question in the affirmative. The Appellate 
Body, applying the same criteria, seemed inclined to answer the question 
in the negative, saying that the evidence presented to the panel "rather 
tends to suggest that these products [asbestos products and substitute 
products] are not 'like products' for the purposes of Article III:4 .... ,,50 
To go from affirmative to negative, the Appellate Body effectively re-
jected the flexible approach taken by the panel in assessing and applying 
the four criteria, and asserted that each of the four must be examined and 
applied separately. The four-step approach of the Appellate Body can be 
summarized, criterion by criterion, as follows. 
i. Physical Characteristics 
In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body was following its custom of 
acting through a three-member Division of its membership (the "AB Di-
vision"). Two members said that toxicity should be subsumed under the 
criterion of physical characteristics. So doing, these two members of the 
AB Division were able to distinguish asbestos products from substitute 
products on the ground that carcinogenic risk to human health is a physi-
cal property relevant to judging the competitive "likeness" of the two 
categories of products. The third member of the AB Division-in a 
"concurring statement" (which, in form, stopped short of being a sepa-
rate concurring opinion)-implied that carcinogenic risk, instead of 
being treated as a physical characteristic, should be viewed as a stand-
alone, health-based fifth criterion for purposes of ruling on "likeness.,,51 
The two members of the AB Division who did not agree with the 
creation of a fifth, health-based criterion for "likeness" seemed to reason 
that, conceptually and contextually, Article 1II:4 deals exclusively with 
economic, competitive relationships, and is not a provision intended to 
govern the protection of human health. These two members of the AB 
Division seemed to be saying that, given this construction of Article 
111:4, the Appellate Body is entitled to create criteria for judging "like-
ness" only on the basis of economic, competitive relationships. 
Apparently, therefore, two members of the AB Division, having adopted 
this view as to the availability of criteria for judging "likeness," were 
50. Id. 'U141. 
51. The concurring statement is found in id. at 'll'll149-54. Since the three members of the 
AB Division signed the Appellate Body report, it would have seemed logical for the concur-
ring member to sign his statement and not leave his identity to guesswork. 
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unwilling (in contrast to the concurring third member) to take the step 
(in the words of the third member, the "small and modest step"S2) of cre-
ating a fifth, health-based criterion for "likeness." Instead, these two 
members reasoned that toxicity is relevant to "likeness" for purposes of, 
and within the confines of, the physical-characteristics criterion endorsed 
by Alcoholic Beverages.53 
Thus, either by treating toxicity as a physical property and subsum-
ing it under the physical-characteristics criterion for "likeness," or by 
implying a fifth, health-based criterion for judging "likeness," the AB 
Division tentatively concluded that carcinogenic asbestos products and 
non-carcinogenic substitute products are not "like products." The AB 
Division had stated, however, that each of the four criteria of Alcoholic 
Beverages must be considered separately, and it therefore proceeded to 
examine the other three in the manner summarized below.54 
ii. End-Uses 
The Appellate Body was critical of the panel's examination of 
whether asbestos products and substitute products have overlapping end-
uses. The panel, the Appellate Body said, only found that "the end-uses 
... are the same 'for a small number' of applications," and failed to offer 
any "elaboration on their nature and character." The Appellate Body 
noted, moreover, that the record provided no evidence regarding end-
uses of asbestos and substitute products "which are not overlapping." 
The Appellate Body therefore declined to rule on the significance of the 
fact that asbestos and substitute products "share a small number of simi-
lar end-uses.,,55 
iii. Consumer Preferences 
The Appellate Body was even more critical of the manner in which 
the panel examined, or failed to examine, the criterion of consumer pref-
erences. The Appellate Body concluded that such an examination "is an 
indispensable-although not, on its own, sufficient-aspect of any de-
termination that products are 'like' ... .',56 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Appellate Body had this to say: 
We do not wish to speculate on what the evidence regarding 
these consumers [manufacturers of products including chrysotile 
asbestos or PCG fibers] would have indicated; rather, we wish to 
52. Id. '11153. 
53. On competitive relationships, see id. at'll'll 99, 115-18. 
54. See id. 'll'll 109, 133. 
55. Id. 'll'll137-38. 
56. Id. 'll139. 
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highlight that consumers' tastes and habits regarding fibres, even 
in the case of commercial parties, such as manufacturers, are 
very likely to be shaped by the health risks associated with a 
product which is known to be highly carcinogenic. A manufac-
turer cannot, for instance, ignore the preferences of the ultimate 
consumer of its products. If the risks posed by a particular prod-
uct are sufficiently great, the ultimate consumer may simply 
cease to buy that product. This would, undoubtedly, affect a 
manufacturer's decisions in the marketplace. Moreover, in the 
case of products posing risks to human health, we think it likely 
that manufacturers' decisions will be influenced by other factors, 
such as the potential civil liability that might flow from market-
ing products posing a health risk to the ultimate consumer, or the 
additional costs associated with safety procedures required to 
use such products in the manufacturing process. 57 
With respect to the five sentences just quoted, the Appellate Body 
cited no basis in the panel's report for its statements, and otherwise of-
fered no footnotes or documentation for the last four sentences. The 
Appellate Body appended the following footnote at the end of the first 
sentence: 
We recognize that consumers' reactions to products posing a risk 
to human health vary considerably depending on the product, 
and on the consumer. Some dangerous products, such as to-
bacco, are widely used, despite the known health risks. The 
influence known dangers have on consumers' tastes and habits 
is, therefore, unlikely to be uniform or entirely predictable. 58 
Further on in its report, the Appellate Body had this to say about 
consumer preferences: 
We consider it likely that the presence of a known carcinogen in 
one of the products will have an influence on consumers' taste 
and habits regarding that product. It may be, for instance, that, 
although cement-based products containing chrysotile asbestos 
fibres are capable of performing the same functions as other ce-
ment-based products, consumers are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, not willing to use products containing chrysotile asbestos 
fibres because of the health risks associated with them. Yet, this 
is only speculation; the point is, there is no evidence. We are of 
the view that a determination on the "likeness" of the cement-
57. Id. '1\ 122 (footnote omitted). 
58. Id. '1\122 n.I03. 
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based products cannot be made, under Article 111:4, in the ab-
sence of an examination of evidence on consumers' tastes and 
habits. And, in this case, no such evidence has been submitted.59 
119 
With respect to the five sentences just quoted, the Appellate Body of-
fered no footnotes other than a footnote referring back to its own earlier 
comments on consumer preferences. 
iv. Tariff Classification 
In effect, the Appellate Body added little to the panel's discussion of 
the tariff-classification criterion. It noted the existence of different tariff 
classifications for asbestos fibers and substitute fibers, and also noted 
that the tariff classification is the same "for any given cement-based 
product,,6Q irrespective of whether the product contains asbestos fibers or 
substitute fibers. The Appellate Body declined to determine what impor-
tance should be attached to tariff classifications "[i]n the absence of a 
full analysis, by the Panel, of the other three criteria addressed .... ,,61 In 
other words, while the Appellate Body proceeded to "complete the 
analysis" offered by the panel for the first three criteria, it declined so to 
act as regards the fourth criterion. 
2. Burden of Proof 
The panel had briefly addressed the matter of comparative burden of 
proof under Article III:4 and under Article XX(b), and had concluded 
that it made no significant difference whether the EU had the burden of 
disputing "likeness" under Article I1I:4 on the basis of the threat that as-
bestos products pose for human health, or had the burden of showing 
that, under Article XX(b), France was entitled to prohibit the importation 
of asbestos on the basis of that same threat. ("Certes, la charge de la 
preuve ne serait sans doute pas sensiblement modifiee dans la mesure OU 
les [Communautes Europeennes] auraient toujours a apporter la preuve 
de la dangerosite du produit, en application de I' adage probatio incumbit 
ejus que dixit.,,)62 
The Appellate Body did not directly address this statement by the 
panel that, irrespective of the rubric under which the EU's claim of a 
health threat ("dangerosite du produit") was judged, the burden of prov-
ing that claim would be on the EU (on "ejus que dixit"); nor did the 
Appellate Body otherwise compare the burden of proof for the EU under 
59. [d. 'lI 145 (footnote omitted). 
60. [d. 'lI 146. 
61. [d. 'lI 124. 
62. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'lI 8.130. Roughly translated, the adage says that 
the burden of proof is on the claimant. 
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Article I1I:4 and under Article XX(b). That is, the Appellate Body did 
not directly comment on the panel's observation that the burden of proof 
would not be significantly changed ("sensiblement modifiee") as be-
tween showing "unlikeness" on grounds of a threat to human health 
(Article 1II:4), or justifying the prohibitions in the French decree on the 
same grounds (Article XX(b». 
Rather, the comments of the Appellate Body on burden of proof 
were substantially limited to the "very heavy burden ... placed on Can-
ada" to prove "likeness" under Article 1II:4, once the carcinogenic nature 
of asbestos products is taken into account. In particular, the Appellate 
Body observed that, it being "clear" that the two categories of products 
(asbestos products and substitute products) "have very different [physi-
cal] properties ... because chrysotile is a known carcinogen, a very 
heavy burden is placed on Canada to show, under the second and third 
criteria [end-uses; consumer preferences], that [asbestos products and 
substitute products] are in ... a competitive relationship.,,63 This ap-
proach to burden of proof has the following elements. It relates to the 
burden of the complaining party (Canada) to prove "likeness" under Ar-
ticle I1I:4 by showing a "competitive relationship" between asbestos 
products and substitute products. It is premised on the carcinogenic na-
ture of asbestos products and the non-carcinogenic nature of substitute 
products. The burden on the party seeking to show "likeness" is "very 
heavy" because that party must show, notwithstanding the carcinogenic 
feature of asbestos products, that those products have overlapping end-
uses with, and appeal to the same consumer preferences as, substitute 
products that are not known carcinogens. 
This approach to burden of proof seems to be interrelated with the 
views of the Appellate Body on the criteria for showing "likeness." It 
seems to be to the effect that, because the carcinogenic nature of asbes-
tos products makes them physically "unlike" substitute products, the 
complaining party has a "very heavy burden" to prove that, under the 
end-uses and consumer-preferences criteria, asbestos products are "like" 
substitute products. If this reading of the Appellate Body's treatment of 
burden of proof is correct, then the subject was dealt with only as to 
Canada's burden to show "likeness" in the context of the second and 
third criteria (end-uses; consumer preferences), and only after a pre-
sumption of "unlikeness" had been raised on the ground that the 
carcinogenic nature of asbestos products constitutes a physical property 
under the first criterion. 
63. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 'll 118. 
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3. Article XI-Non-Tariff Barrier 
Before the panel, Canada had claimed that the French decree vio-
lated not only Article 1II:4 but also Article Xl's prohibition against non-
tariff barriers.64 In response, the EU had argued that only Article III:4, to 
the exclusion of Article XI, was applicable to the French decree. The EU 
argument was to the effect that the decree was an internal French regula-
tion applicable to both domestic and imported products, that it was not a 
measure covering only the importation of products, and that it therefore 
fell under Article 111:4. According to the EU, under established GATT 
practice, if a measure applies to both domestic and imported products, it 
is governed by Article I1I:4.65 Canada, on the other hand, took the further 
position that, if the decree cannot be considered under both Article I1I:4 
and Article XI, it should be evaluated as a quantitative restriction in vio-
lation of Article XI, since, considered overall, the essence of the decree 
is to erect a non-tariff barrier against imports. ("ConsidenS d'une maniere 
globale, Ie Decret porte, de par sa substance et son caractere veritable, 
sur les importations.,,)66 
This Article XI controversy was not resolved. The panel upon find-
ing a violation of Article I1I:4 found it unnecessary to reach Article XI. 
The Appellate Body, reversing the panel as to Article III:4 and affirming 
as to Article XX(b), did not deal with Article XI. 
4. Article XX (b)-Human Life or Health 
Both the panel and the Appellate Body determined that the French 
decree was a measure necessary to protect human life or health and, as 
such, came under the ambit of Article XX(b). The panel relied on expert 
testimony relating to the deadly nature of, and measures necessary to 
protect the public from fatal diseases caused by, chrysotile asbestos. The 
panel report reviewed this testimony in some detai1. 67 In large part, the 
Appellate Body relied on the panel report in this connection, observed 
that the panel enjoyed considerable discretion in the evaluation of the 
testimony in question, and concluded that the panel had not abused its 
discretion.68 According to the Appellate Body: 
64. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'll 3.394. 
65. ld. 'll'll 3.395-.396. The EU was relying on language found in Ad Article III of GATT 
1994. 
66. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'll'lI 3.467-.468, 3.470. 
67. The testimony and related text are extensive, covering almost 200 single-spaced 
pages in the panel report (entitled Consultation du groupe special avec des experts scienti-
fiques), plus an Addendum, supra note 16, of over 200 single-spaced pages. See Asbestos 
Panel report, supra note 3, 'll'll5.1-.659. 
68. See Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 'll'll162-63. 
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The Panel enjoyed a margin of discretion in assessing the value 
of the evidence, and the weight to be ascribed to that evidence. 
The Panel was entitled, in the exercise of its discretion, to de-
termine that certain elements of evidence should be accorded 
more weight than other elements-that is the essence of the task 
of appreciating the evidence.t>9 
In particular, the Appellate Body affirmed the panel's rejection of the 
Canadian argument based on the "controlled use" of asbestos products. 
Here, the panel had concluded that France, in formulating its decree, 
could reasonably conclude that "controlled use" was not a "reasonably 
available" measure for dealing with asbestos products.
7o 
5. The TBT Agreement 
The TBT Agreement (dealing with technical barriers to trade) is one 
of the agreements that was prepared in connection with, and that came 
into effect upon, the creation of the WTO. One of its recitals indicates 
that it was drafted to "further the objectives of GATT 1994," and another 
of its recitals sets out language identical to language found in Article XX 
of GATT 1994 (relating, among other things, to measures necessary for 
the protection of human life or health).71 
Canada argued that the French decree constituted a technical regula-
tion incompatible with the TBT Agreement. 72 The panel dismissed this 
argument on the ground that the relevant portion of the French decree 
was not a technical regulation but a general prohibition of asbestos prod-
uctS. 73 The Appellate Body, noting that another portion of the French 
decree contains exceptions to the general prohibition, reversed the panel 
on this point, and ruled that the French decree, taken as a whole, does 
constitute a technical regulation for purposes of the TBT Agreement.
74 
Having done this, however, the Appellate Body did not decide whether 
the French decree does or does not violate the TBT Agreement.
75 
The Appellate Body thus declined to rule on Canada's claim under 
the TBT Agreement. Its inaction in this regard seems to have had two 
bases. First, the panel had made no findings in respect of the Canadian 
claim. Second, according to the Appellate Body, the meaning of the "ob-
ligations" in the TBT Agreement, as well as in a predecessor agreement 
under the old GATT, had never been construed by any GATT or WTO 
69. [d. '11161. 
70. [d. '11'11 173-75. 
71. TBT Agreement pmbl., second and sixth recitals, respectively. 
72. See Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, '11'11 3.245-.249. 
73. See id. '11'118.39, 8.72-73. 
74. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, '11'1164-76. 
75. [d. '11'1178-83. 
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panel, or by the Appellate Body itselC6 Leaving the Canadian claim in 
limbo thus appears to have been consistent with a tradition of not 
supplying interpretations of the "obligations" in the TBT Agreement. 
COMMENTARY 
There follows a commentary on the aspects of the Asbestos case set 
out above. Its focus is the relationship between the panel and the Appel-
late Body in the case itself and, more generally, in the context of WTO 
dispute settlement. 
I. "Like Products" 
As discussed above, the panel gave "like products" in Article I1I:4 
the same scope given to both "like products" and "directly competitive 
and substitutable products" in the Appellate Body's report in the Alco-
holic Beverages case, and took a flexible approach in applying the four 
criteria endorsed by that case for determining "likeness." So doing, the 
panel determined that asbestos products and substitute products are "like 
products" at the critical point when their properties are evaluated in 
terms of their end-uses. Also as discussed above, the Appellate Body 
provided an exegesis on the variable scope of "likeness," announced that 
each of the four criteria of the Alcoholic Beverages case must be applied 
separately, announced that toxicity is a physical property for purposes of 
applying the first of those criteria, declined (by two votes to one in the 
AB Division) to announce that toxicity is a separate, fifth criterion, ob-
served that the panel had not provided sufficient information on the 
degree to which asbestos products and substitute products do and do not 
have overlapping end-uses, speculated on consumer preferences as be-
tween asbestos products and substitute products, and in the course of its 
analysis suggested that they are not "like products." 
The Appellate Body seems to have hesitated between two different 
ways to deal with the issue of "like products." One apparent line of 
reasoning was that the toxicity of asbestos products affects their ability 
to compete economically with substitute products to the point that, given 
the competitive, economic framework of Article 111:4, the two categories 
of product cannot be considered "like" for purposes of Article III:4.77 
The other and quite different line of reasoning was that the panel report 
failed to supply sufficient evidence under the four criteria to support a 
finding that asbestos products and substitute products are "like" 
76. Id. '1181. 
77. See id. '11'1199, 113-16. 
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products.78 Formally, the Appellate Body can be said to have concluded 
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Canadian argument for 
"like products.,,79 Substantively, however, the Appellate Body's reasoning 
as to "likeness" seems to have rested squarely on the toxicity of asbestos 
products.8o This apparent ambiguity as to the underlying reason(s) for 
Appellate Body's conclusion-was it toxicity, or was it lack of 
evidence?-merits further analysis, because the panel should be able to 
understand, and future panels should be able to understand, why the 
Appellate Body came to the conclusion that it did as to "likeness." 
Moreover, either of those reasons has important implications for 
WTO jurisprudence. Has the law of "likeness" been changed so that 
toxic products are "unlike" non-toxic products when toxicity is viewed 
as a physical characteristic in the context of the first of the Alcoholic 
Beverages criteria? Or, notwithstanding the view that toxicity is a first-
criterion physical characteristic, would the report of the Asbestos panel 
have found favor with the Appellate Body had the panel scrupulously set 
out the evidence of "likeness" in some detail separately for each of the 
four criteria? The Appellate Body's analysis is not particularly helpful in 
answering these questions. Its accordion imagery as to "likeness" was 
merely a step toward the strangely worded and unnecessary dictum that 
"like products" in Article 111:4 is not a broader concept than the com-
bined concepts of "like products" and "directly competitive or 
substitutable products" in Article 111:2.81 (The dictum may also be inac-
curate, given the breadth of Article 1II:4-"all laws, regulations and 
requirements"-compared to that of Article 1II:2-"internal taxes.") 
Here, a word about the four criteria seems in order. There are, for 
present purposes, but three, because neither the panel nor the Appellate 
Body attached any significance to the fourth criterion relating to tariff 
classification. Of the three, it would seem that toxicity considered only 
as a physical characteristic under the first criterion is insufficient to es-
tablish "unlikeness." Otherwise, why did the Appellate Body insist on 
separately examining the second and third criteria? In this connection, it 
would seem that it examined the second criterion, end-uses, to show the 
inadequacy of the record as to "likeness," but that its discussion of the 
third criterion, consumer preferences, was intended to buttress a conclu-
sion based on toxicity. 
78. See id. ~~ 118. 145. 147. 
79. See id. ~ 192(c). (d). 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 53. 57. and 59. 
81. See Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra note 4. ~~ 88, 96. 99. 
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2. Toxicity 
As has been mentioned, the two prevailing members of the AB Divi-
sion seemed to be of the opinion that toxicity can be considered under 
Article 1Il:4 only as it relates to competitive, economic relationships, and 
cannot be considered there as it relates to measures adopted to protect 
human life and health. Although the Appellate Body did not say so, this 
view does not seem so different from the view of the panel to the effect 
that the proper context for considering human life and health is not Arti-
cle 1II:4 but Article XX(b). Restricting itself to viewing toxicity in terms 
of its effect on economic competition, the Appellate Body, in its discus-
sion of the second criterion, speculated on how consumers choose 
between toxic asbestos products, and non-toxic substitute products. It 
did not attempt to substantiate this speculation. Indeed, the only footnote 
in support of the Appellate Body's speculation on consumer reactions to 
the dangers of asbestos pointed out that tobacco is widely known to be a 
dangerous product, and that, despite this, consumer reactions are neither 
uniform nor predictable.82 
Much of the Appellate Body's second-criterion speculation seems 
questionable. The Appellate Body suggested that manufacturer-
consumers would be deterred by a lack of a market for asbestos prod-
ucts, or by fear of civil liability, or by additional costs associated with 
safety procedures. One can question, however, whether the French de-
cree would have been necessary or would have become the subject of 
dispute if there were no French market for asbestos products. In addi-
tion, one can as easily speculate that manufacturers using asbestos 
products would consider civil liability or safety procedures as costs of 
doing business, and would take these factors into account in pricing their 
own products. For better or worse, it is not inconceivable that there is a 
substantial market for asbestos products, notwithstanding their known 
carcinogenic properties. 
Speculation either way misses a fundamental point, namely, that 
measures taken to protect human life and health are rarely adopted on 
the basis of consumer preferences. Rather, they are adopted on the basis 
of decisions by public authorities as to what is in the public interest. 
Consumers may prefer unfettered access to this or that product harmful 
to human health. Notwithstanding such a preference, public authorities, 
exercising their judgment as to what is in the public interest, step in and 
deny unfettered access by would-be consumers to certain harmful prod-
ucts. Tobacco (the only product mentioned in the Appellate Body's only 
relevant footnote on the point) is illustrative (indeed, the footnote on the 
82. Id. '11122 n.I03. 
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unpredictability of consumer preferences is more on point than the 
speculative text to which it is attached).83 Laws regulating consumer ac-
cess to tobacco are not promoted by would-be consumers of tobacco 
products; they are the work of persons concerned with human health. 
Even more telling examples exist of public-health measures that flout 
consumer preferences, relating to quite strict prohibitions involving 
products that are deemed to be more harmful than tobacco. 84 
This point is not unrelated to the view of the panel that the provision 
of GATT 1994 applicable to toxicity is Article XX(b), dealing with 
measures necessary to protect human life and health. Whatever the merit 
of the panel's views as to the structure of GATT 1994, the Appellate 
Body does seem to have taken itself rather far afield by attempting to 
deal with "likeness" through speculation that would correlate toxicity 
with consumer preferences. To the extent that the Appellate Body's con-
clusion as to "likeness" is based on its speculation as to consumer 
preferences, the basis for the conclusion is not convincing. 
3. Evidence as to "Likeness" 
As mentioned above, the Appellate Body states in its report that the 
panel failed to provide adequate evidence that asbestos products and 
substitute products are "like products." This evidentiary point was raised 
in particular as regards the second criterion, that is, the end-uses of the 
two categories of products. The panel, the Appellate Body said, con-
tented itself with establishing the bare fact that the end-uses of the two 
categories are the same for "a small number" of applications, and did not 
attempt to evaluate the applications for which the two categories do and 
do not have overlapping end-uses.R5 It is thus strongly implied that the 
83. Information on the regulation of tobacco in the United States can be found on the 
website of the National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion: To-
bacco Information and Prevention Source, Selected Actions of the U.S. Government Regarding 
the Regulation of Tobacco Sales. Marketing. and Use, at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/ 
overview/regulate.htm; Tobacco Information and Prevention Source, State Laws on Tobacco 
Control-United States, 1998 (June 25, 1999), available at http://www.cdc.govltobacco/ 
research_datallegal_policy/mmwrss699.htm; Tobacco Information and Prevention Source, 
State Laws on Tobacco Control-United States, 1998: MMWR Highlights (June 25, 1999), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/research_datallegal_policy/mmwr699fs.htm. 
84. See. e.g., Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.c. §§ 801-904 (2000). 
85. The panel actually said the following: 
[Mjeme si les utilisations finales des fibres de chrysotile d'une part et les fibres 
[competitivesl d'autre part ne sont les memes que dans une faible partie de leurs 
applications respectives, il y a des circonstances OU ces applications sont similaires. 
A ce moment leurs proprietes sont equivalents, sinon identiques .... 
Fall 20011 The Asbestos Case 127 
two categories cannot be found to be "like products" for the purpose of 
Article IlI:4 because the evidence adduced by the panel to show "like-
ness" was inadequate. 
This evidentiary and procedural reasoning is rather different from a 
finding of "unlikeness" on grounds of toxicity in one category but not 
the other. It seems to require substantial evidence of overlapping end-
uses to support a conclusion that the two categories have been shown to 
be "like." When one reads the reports of the panel and the Appellate 
Body, including the presentations of Canada and the EU, as a whole, 
however, this evidentiary reasoning as to end-uses seems rather thin. The 
arguments of the parties and the French decree itself seem premised on 
the proposition that, were asbestos products freely admitted into France, 
they would be put to a great many end-uses, no small number of which 
would be highly competitive with the end-uses of substitute products. 
The record suggests that unrestricted access to asbestos products would 
reveal a variety of potential end-uses for those products.86 Moreover, it 
would seem that overlapping end-uses, actual and potential, can shift 
over time, depending on technology and market opportunity, and that, 
health considerations to one side, asbestos products would not be re-
stricted in competing with substitute products. In short, the Appellate 
Body's extrapolation of the "small number" of overlapping end-uses into 
a major evidentiary flaw seems somewhat artificial. 
The discussion of end-uses by the Appellate Body seems artificial 
because it sidesteps the question of whether asbestos products are 
commercially substitutable for relevant non-asbestos products; that is, 
whether, in the absence of health-based legal restrictions on the 
importation and use of asbestos products, they would be imported and 
used as substitutes for the non-asbestos products to which they are being 
Nous avons deja constate ci-dessus que les proprietes respectives des fibres de chry-
sotile d'une part et des fibres [competitives] d'autre part pcrmettaient certaines 
utilisations finales identiques ou du moins similaires .... [AJ notre avis, Ie fait que 
to utes les utilisations finales de ces fibres ne soient pas similaires ne suffit pas a en 
faire des produits non similaires. 
Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'lI'l1 8.125, 8.136 (footnote omitted). It can be argued 
that the Appellate Body failed to do justice to this text indicating that the panel, on evaluating 
end-uses, concluded (a) that there were a sufficient number of overlapping end-uses to render 
asbestos products and substitute products "like," and (b) that the fact that all of the end-uses 
were not "like" did not operate to make the two categories of product "unlike." 
86. Both Canada and the EU emphasized the large number of end-uses for asbestos prod-
ucts. Canada referred to "3000 applications" and elaborated thereon. The EU commented on 
the many uses for asbestos and the extremely broad range of products containing asbestos that 
are put on the market (,,[Clompte tenu des multiples applications de I'amiante, I'eventail des 
produits mis sur Ie marche en contenant a ete extremement large"). {d. 'lI'l13.21, 3.23. 
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compared.8? As a commercial matter, the question of overlapping end-
uses turns on product substitutability in the marketplace. The panel 
report clearly shows that both Canada and the EU considered the 
relevant non-asbestos products to be substitutable for asbestos products. 88 
Thus, the record in the Asbestos case clearly supports the proposition 
that the relevant non-asbestos products are substitutable for asbestos 
products. It would, therefore, seem indisputable that, on the basis of this 
record, the reverse proposition is true, namely, that asbestos products are 
substitutable for the relevant non-asbestos products. This being so, it is 
difficult to understand why the Appellate Body, in its discussion of end-
uses, sidestepped a record showing that asbestos products are actual or 
potential substitutes for the relevant non-asbestos products. The 
Appellate Body's treatment of the lack of evidence as to "likeness" 
seems to distort the second criterion on end-uses. Given the overall 
record in the Asbestos case, it seems clear that, but for laws based on 
their carcinogenic properties, asbestos products would occupy a 
substantial place in commerce and hence in multilateral trade. On the 
point of overlapping end-uses, it thus seems clear that, but for those 
laws, asbestos products would represent an important commercial 
standard by which other products would be measured for a not 
inconsiderable number of end-uses. 
4. "Aim and Effects" Test 
As mentioned above,89 in the Alcoholic Beverages case the Appellate 
Body had affirmed a panel's rejection of a proposed "aim and effects" 
test whereby "likeness" under Article III would turn on whether the aim 
and trade effects of a measure were protectionist of domestic products 
against imported products. It is interesting to note that, had this test been 
adopted and thus been available in the Asbestos case, the panel in that 
case might have disposed of the case under Article I1I:4, and might not 
have had to reach Article XX(b). Because the French decree did not dis-
criminate against imported products in order to protect domestic 
products, it presumably would not have been found in violation of the 
"aim and effects" test and, for this reason, imported asbestos products 
might not have been found by the panel to be "like products" for pur-
poses of Article 1II:4. Use of "aim and effects," had it been made 
87. The non-asbestos products here relevant are derived from polyvinyl alcohol fibers, or 
cellulose fibers, or glass fibers, and are referred to herein as "substitute products." See supra 
text preceding note 31. 
88. For Canada, see, for example, Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'Il9l3.28, 3.45 (b). 
For the EU, see, for example, id. 'II'll 3.426, 3.428. 
89. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
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available by the Appellate Body, could have greatly facilitated the search 
for an Article 1II:4 rationale for disposing of Asbestos. 
5. Non-Tariff Barrier 
If the panel's evidentiary failure (as asserted by the Appellate Body) 
means that asbestos products and substitute products have no material 
overlapping end-uses, then it might well follow that (for purposes of the 
Asbestos case) asbestos products are unique, and that the French decree 
is a non-tariff barrier to their importation which is inconsistent with Arti-
cle Xl. As mentioned above, Canada instituted a claim that the French 
decree created a non-tariff barrier inconsistent with Article XI-a claim 
which was dealt with by neither the panel nor the Appellate Body. The 
panel found this claim extraneous to its findings that the French decree 
(I) was a violation of Article III:4, but (2) was justified under Article 
XX(b) as a measure necessary to protect human life or health. The Ap-
pellate Body (having overturned the panel's Article 1Il:4 ruling) gave no 
explanation for not ruling on the Article XI claim. Even so, by upholding 
the panel with respect to Article XX(b), the Appellate Body, without giv-
ing any rationale for passing by the Article XI claim in silence, could 
have had an Article XX (b) rationale for doing so. 
There are two problems with positing such a sub silencio rationale. 
The first is that it assumes, in the absence of panel findings, that Article 
XI forbids France from subjecting the importation of asbestos products 
from Canada to non-tariff "prohibitions or restrictions" of the type found 
in the French decree. A reading of the bare text of Article XI would ap-
pear to be consistent with this conclusion, but the Article XI claim was 
not critical to the approach adopted by the panel and therefore was not 
discussed by it. 90 
For present purposes, the second problem is more pertinent. Had the 
Appellate Body addressed the issue of whether the French decree was a 
violation of Article XI, the Appellate Body would not have been able to 
dispose of this issue on the ground that asbestos products and substitute 
products are not "like products." The entire "like products" analysis en-
gaged in by the Appellate Body under Article IlI:4 would have been beside 
the point under Article Xl. An Article XI violation, had one been found, 
would have sent the Appellate Body directly into Article XX(b)-the very 
90. Article XI: I of GAlT 1994 reads as follows: "No prohibitions or restrictions other 
than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party .... " The panel did 
not consider this text, or the text of Ad Article III of GAlT 1994, relied on by the EU (see 
supra text accompanying note 65). 
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provision, of course, upon which the panel had ultimately rested its re-
port. 
6. "Measures Necessary to Protect Human Life or Health" 
The French decree was concerned not with the three criteria of 
"likeness" relied on by the Appellate Body, but with the protection of 
human life and health. It was concerned not with the relative competitive 
aspects of toxicity viewed as a physical characteristic, not with evidence 
as to particular overlapping end-uses, and certainly not with consumer 
preferences. Quite irrespective of these factors, the French decree was 
adopted to protect human life and health by preventing a known carcino-
gen from being imported into or used in France. 
The panel report, by moving rather efficiently into Article XX(b), 
was informed by the purpose of the French decree and, with an economy 
of effort, was drafted to evaluate the decree in terms of its manifest ob-
jective. Did the panel thereby fail to tarry any longer than it deemed 
absolutely necessary on the issue of "likeness"? Did it simply assume 
that there was at least some significant market for some asbestos prod-
ucts that were competitive with substitute products? These questions 
may slight the not inconsiderable attention given by the panel to the 
question of "likeness." Even so, it is tempting to think of the panel as 
looking upon the "likeness" debate as a somewhat arcane diversion from 
efficiently disposing of the French decree in terms of its stated objective 
and pursuant to that provision of GAIT 1994 which expressly covers 
that objective. 
The approach adopted by the panel raises two substantive legal is-
sues, each of which is mentioned in the panel report. The first is whether 
the structure of GATT 1994 dictates the approach taken by the panel in 
dealing with a measure adopted to protect human life or health. The sec-
ond is whether, in contrast to Article I1I:4, Article XX(b) places an undue 
burden of proof on the party to a trade dispute that is called upon to jus-
tify a trade barrier on the basis of the protection of human life or health. 
a. The Structure of GATT 1994 
It cannot be said that the panel's views are altogether lacking in 
merit. GAIT 1994 follows the structure of the old GATT and brings with 
it over fifty years of jurisprudence.91 GATT 1994 is designed to remove 
barriers to trade and, at the same time, to recognize that there are legiti-
mate purposes which constitute exceptions to that objective and which 
justify certain policy-oriented barriers to trade. In its general structure, 
91. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 1-18. 
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GATT 1994 first creates violations of WTO law that arise when specified 
barriers to trade are erected, and then sets out exceptions to those viola-
tions, the exceptions being grounded in specifically recognized 
policies.92 Frequently, therefore, a case involving a trade dispute deals, 
first, with an alleged violation raised by the complaining party and, sec-
ond, with a specific exception claimed by the defending party as a 
justification for the violation. For this reason, a defending party to a 
WTO trade dispute will frequently both deny an alleged violation and 
have recourse to one of the exceptions in order to justify the violation. 
A highly relevant example is the 1996 report of the Appellate Body 
in a case involving clean-air environmental standards adopted by the 
United States for fuel additives (the "Gasoline Additives case,,).93 Briefly, 
the United States had adopted stricter environmental standards for for-
eign gasoline refiners than for domestic gasoline refiners; Brazil and 
Venezuela had complained under Article I1I:4; and the United States had 
invoked one of the General Exceptions in Article XX-the exception 
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" 94_the 
claimed natural resource being clean air. The panel had found a violation 
of Article I1I:4, and the United States had not appealed this finding. The 
issue before the Appellate Body, therefore, was whether the violation 
was justified under the claimed exception. The Appellate Body found 
that the U.S. measures in question were indeed "measures relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources." The Appellate Body then 
found, however, that the discriminatory feature of the U.S. measures, 
being stricter for foreign refiners than for domestic refiners, was incon-
sistent with the introductory clause of Article XX.95 
92. "General Exceptions" are found in GATT 1994 Article XX relating to (a) public mor-
aIs, (b) human, animal or plant life or health, (c) trade in gold or silver, (d) securing 
compliance with domestic laws and regulations, (e) prison labor, (f) the protection of cultural 
treasures, (g) conserving exhaustible natural resources, (h) obligations under commodity 
agreements, (i) assuring domestic access to essential materials, (j) dealing with products in 
short supply. "Security Exceptions" are found in Article XXI. 
93. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, WTIDS2/ABIR (April 29, 1996), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter 
Gasoline Additives case]. 
94. GATT 1994 Art. XX(g). 
95. The introductory clause (also known as the chapeau) reads: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement [GATT 1994] shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of [the following] measures. 
GATT 1994 Art. XX chapeau. In the case of Article XX(b), the words following this clause 
are: "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." 
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The introductory clause of Article XX is designed to prevent trade 
protectionism in the guise of a measure that, ostensibly, serves an other-
wise valid and recognized public policy, such as safeguarding the 
environment, or human life or health. Thus, to qualify as an exception 
under Article XX, a measure may not arbitrarily or unjustifiably dis-
criminate "between countries where the same conditions prevail," and 
may not be "a disguised restriction on international trade." In the Gaso-
line Additives case, the Appellate Body found that the discriminatory 
feature of the U.S. regulations there at issue-which were stricter for 
foreign than for domestic refiners-rendered them an arbitrary and un-
justifiable form of protectionism of domestic refiners as against foreign 
refiners, and a disguised restriction on international trade in refined 
I· 96 gaso me. 
The panel in the Asbestos case was quite cognizant of the implica-
tions of the Gasoline Additives case for dealing with the French decree 
under Article XX(b). The panel cited and referred to Gasoline Additives 
in scrupulous detail, and expressly couched its reasoning in terms of the 
conditions found in the introductory paragraph of Article XX as they 
apply to a measure claimed to be within the ambit of Article XX(b).97 
Moreover, the panel was urged by two countries that filed third-party 
briefs in the Asbestos case, Brazil and Zimbabwe, to take the position 
that the French decree was in effect an abuse of Article XX(b), and was 
more restrictive of international trade than was required in order to safe-
guard human life or health in France.98 
Thus, by disposing of the Asbestos case under Article XX(b), the 
panel was dealing with a provision that required the EU (acting on be-
half of France) to demonstrate that the French decree, first, was 
necessary for the protection of human life or health and, second, was not 
a trade-protectionist measure in the guise of a measure for the protection 
of human life or health. To meet the first requirement, the EU provided 
substantial evidence and testimony to establish the carcinogenic threat 
posed by asbestos products.99 To meet the second requirement, the EU 
could point to the text of the French decree itself, which applies its pro-
hibitions equally to all asbestos products, domestic or foreign, and (in 
the language of the introductory paragraph of Article XX) does not arbi-
trarily or unjustifiably discriminate "between countries where the same 
96. Gasoline Additives case, supra note 93, at 20-27 ("IV. The Introductory Provisions of 
Article XX of the General Agreement: Applying the Chapeau of the General Exceptions"). 
97. See Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'lI'l18.227, 8.235-.237. These conditions were 
referred to as "Ie contr61e qu'exerce Ie paragraphe introductif de l'article XX sur les abus 
eventuels de I'article XX(b) dans l'application de la mesure." [d. 'lI8.130. 
98. [d. 'lI'l14.1-.45 (Brazil), 'lI'l14.75-.98 (Zimbabwe). 
99. [d. 'lI'l15.574-.581. 
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conditions prevail."loo Under the French decree, any country producing 
asbestos products faces the same prohibitions. 
These two requirements imposed on the EU to justify the French de-
cree pursuant to Article XX(b) have been seen by certain commentators 
as unduly burdensome. Thus, when the Appellate Body reversed the 
panel on the matter of "like products" under Article I1I:4, these commen-
tators were of the view that the WTO had made it less burdensome to 
justify measures for the protection of human life or health-and, by ex-
tension, measures for the protection of the environment-and had 
thereby moved in a welcome and salutary direction. The comments were 
to the effect that a country defending such measures before the WTO 
would have an easier task, in terms of burden of proof, in showing that 
products were not "like products" under Article 1II:4 than in meeting the 
double requirement Gust discussed) of Article XX(b ).101 
Possibly anticipating this line of reasoning, the panel had briefly ob-
served that, for purposes of burden of proof, it made no significant 
difference whether the EU was required to show "unlikeness" under Ar-
ticle I1I:4, or was required to meet the requirements of Article XX(b).102 
In addition, according to the panel, because Article XX(b) is subject to 
the conditions found in the introductory paragraph of Article XX (de-
scribed above), in applying Article XX(b), the panel was following the 
principle laid down by the Appellate Body in earlier cases to give effect 
to all provisions ("donner sens a toutes les dispositions") of GATT 
1994. 103 Even so, the Appellate Body reversed the panel. The questions 
thus arise, was the panel correct as to burden of proof, or was the Appel-
late Body correct in reversing the panel on the issue of "likeness"? 
b. Burden of Proof 
Under WTO case law, the party bringing a complaint has the burden 
of bringing forth evidence to make out a prima facie case substantiating 
the complaint. Once the complaining party has made out such a case, the 
burden then shifts to the defending party to bring forth evidence to the 
contrary. It is for the panel hearing the case to decide when the burden 
shifts. This decision is subject to appeal to the Appellate Body. There is 
no WTO case law as to which party bears the ultimate burden of persua-
sion, a matter that is left to the several panels on a case-by-case basis and 
that is also subject to appeal. 104 
100. See id. '11'11 8.223-.224. 
101. See NGO Commentaries, supra note I I . 
102. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 'II 8.130. 
103. Id. 
104. These statements as to WTO case law are based on the Report of the Appellate 
Body, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from 
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In the Asbestos case, in respect of Canada's claim that asbestos 
products and substitute products are "like products" within the meaning 
of Article III :4, Canada had the burden of producing evidence making 
out a prima facie case to that effect, and, in the event Canada met that 
burden, the EU (on behalf of France) had the burden of producing con-
trary evidence to establish that the two categories of products are not 
"like products." The panel, looking basically at that moment when the 
two categories of products are put to the same end use, determined that 
Canada had made out a case for "likeness" and the EU had not made out 
a case for "unlikeness." 
The Appellate Body did not agree with the criterion used by the 
panel in judging "likeness" versus "unlikeness," and effectively changed 
that criterion. According to the Appellate Body, each of the four criteria 
(only three of which were in fact invoked) from the Alcoholic Beverages 
case should be examined separately, and in the course of this examina-
tion toxicity should be considered a physical property for the purpose of 
weighing the relative competitiveness of the two categories of products. 
The Appellate Body thus reversed the panel not on the issue of burden of 
proof, but on the issue of the proper criterion for jUdging the type of 
proof required. 
The panel had required proof in the context of one criterion. The 
Appellate Body ruled that the panel had should have required proof in a 
materially different context. Accordingly, the question of burden of proof 
was not addressed by the panel within the framework deemed applicable 
by the Appellate Body. Unable to send the case back to the panel,lOs the 
Appellate Body purported to "complete the analysis" undertaken by the 
panel. At this point, the issue of burden of proof comes unraveled in the 
Asbestos case. The Appellate Body said two things: one, that toxicity 
should be considered when judging the competitiveness of the two cate-
gories of products; two, that when this factor is taken into account the 
complaining party (Canada) failed to adduce sufficient evidence as to 
"likeness." The issue of burden of proof thereupon becomes unraveled 
because, of course, Canada was never given an opportunity to bring forth 
evidence under the standard established by the Appellate Body on ap-
peal. There is, therefore, no way of knowing whether, when Canada was 
presenting its case to the panel, it would then have made out a prima fa-
cie case that, viewed in terms of relative competitiveness and taking into 
account the toxicity of asbestos products, they are, notwithstanding their 
toxicity, competitively "like" substitute products. 
India, WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr. I (April 25 and May 27, 1997), at 11-15 (Iv. "Burden of 
Proof'). 
105. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 147-52. 
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A reading of the French decree and of the record in the Asbestos 
case suggests that asbestos products, notwithstanding their toxicity, may 
well be competitive with substitute products. The Appellate Body's 
speculative comments on consumer tastes do little to dispel the inference 
that consumers, cognizant of the fact that chrysotile asbestos is a deadly 
carcinogen, will nonetheless use asbestos products for the very reason 
that they are competitive with substitute products. In short, it seems quite 
speculative to assume that, had Canada, before the panel, been asked to 
make out a prima facie case of "likeness" under the standard established 
by the Appellate Body on appeal, Canada would have failed to do so. In 
the event that Canada had succeeded in doing so, then the burden of 
showing "unlikeness" would have shifted to the EU. 
Guesswork as to what might have happened is an unsatisfactory way 
of dealing with the issue of burden of proof. Even so, one can ask 
whether, in terms of burden of proof, the Appellate Body made a con-
structive contribution to WTO law by coming forward with its new basis 
for judging whether a complaining party has made out a prima facie 
case. It is far from clear that the Appellate Body did act constructively. In 
an area where the defending party seems to have a genuine concern with 
protecting human life and health, the defending party, instead of arguing 
directly to that concern, is placed by the Appellate Body in the position 
of having to refute the competitiveness of products notwithstanding their 
threat to human health. Competitiveness is not the issue. Making it the 
issue diverts the parties and the panel from the central question of pro-
tecting human life and health. 
Indeed, the analysis provided by the Appellate Body could make it 
more difficult, not easier, to deal with measures taken to protect human 
life and health, or to protect the environment. These are not measures 
readily susceptible of being judged in terms of relative competitiveness 
under Article III:4. As the Asbestos panel pointed out, these are measures 
expressly covered (as to human health) in Article XX(b). The panel was 
thus able to suggest that going directly to Article XX (b) placed no 
greater burden of proof on the EU than it would have faced under Article 
III:4 in attempting to rebut a prima facie case as to "likeness." 
There is, of course, a further element in Article XX (mentioned by 
the panel), which is its introductory clause as interpreted by the Appel-
late Body in the Gasoline Additives case. Under that clause, a measure 
that ostensibly is designed to protect (for example) human health or the 
environment may not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
"countries where the same conditions prevail," or constitute a "disguised 
restriction on international trade." There may be advocates of environ-
mental or other causes who would like to revise this provision. On its 
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face, however, it has the merit of holding human life, health, or environ-
mental measures to a standard of genuineness and fairness, and of not 
permitting them to be used to mask trade protectionism. In any event, the 
provision was invoked and elaborated on by the Appellate Body in the 
Gasoline Additives case. Revising it would probably bring into play in-
terests on both sides of the issue. For example, given the position taken 
by Brazil and Zimbabwe in the Asbestos case l06 and the position taken by 
many developing nations with respect WTO law generally,'07 it can be 
expected that, were an effort made to change this provision, its retention 
might attract considerable support. 
Let us indulge, for a moment, in a hypothetical inspired by the 
Gasoline Additives case. France adopts a somewhat different decree re-
lating to asbestos products. This decree permits the importation and sale 
of asbestos products that have an established history of controlled use, 
monitored by the French Ministry of Health. The French Parliament, 
however, under pressure from domestic interests, gives the Ministry a 
budget for monitoring only French-source asbestos products. The result 
is that imported products are denied any means of meeting the require-
ments as to controlled use, and are thereby excluded. Should the WTO, 
in the name of protecting human life and health, permit this protectionist 
measure to pass challenge? No answer to this question is likely to satisfy 
all of the interest groups affected by it, and consideration of the question 
might well result in a decision to retain the introductory paragraph of 
Article XX in its present form. 
To return to the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body, by introducing 
the notion that toxicity is relevant to competitiveness in the context of 
judging "likeness" under Article IlI:4, did nothing to clarify questions 
involving burden of proof. If anything, they have been confused. The 
standard of proof to be deduced from the Appellate Body's report was 
not applied in a functional way; that is, it was not elaborated in the actual 
hearing of the case, by either the panel or the Appellate Body. Future 
panels will have to deal with this confusion, and will have to do so lack-
ing significant guidance as to how their decisions will be viewed on 
appeal. 
7. The TBT Agreement 
As mentioned above, Canada's claim in the Asbestos case that the 
French decree violated the TBT Agreement (the WTO agreement on 
106. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
107. See. e.g .• Jagdish Bhagwati. Break the Link Between Trade and Labour, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Aug. 29, 2001, at 13; Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: Protesting for Whom? 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001. atAl9. 
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technical barriers to trade) was rejected by the panel on the ground that 
the TBT Agreement did not cover the decree; the panel's views were in 
turn rejected by the Appellate Body, but it did not dispose of Canada's 
claim, which was left in limbo. Two loose ends remain for commentary 
in this connection: should the Appellate Body (1) have rejected the views 
of the panel and (2) having done so, have left the Canadian claim unre-
solved? 
The panel reasoned that the operative part of the French decree was 
a complete ban on importing and using asbestos, and that a complete ban 
is not a technical barrier to trade within the meaning of the TBT Agree-
ment. The Appellate Body observed that the complete ban in one section 
of the decree was subject to certain exceptions elsewhere in the decree, 
which transformed the decree, considered as a whole, into a technical 
barrier to trade covered by the TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body did 
not make it clear, however, why the exceptions served to work this trans-
formation, particularly since, as regards the issues raised in the Asbestos 
case, none of the exceptions seems to have been relevant. 108 One could 
defer to the Appellate Body's superior expertise as regards the TBT 
Agreement, except for the fact that the Appellate Body seemed reluctant 
really to come to grips with that agreement, and shied away from "com-
pleting the analysis" of the panel by disposing of the Canadian claim 
thereunder. 
Such diffidence on the part of the Appellate Body stands in stark 
contrast to its willingness to engage in analysis-completion in a great 
many areas. Moreover, the task here, but for the fact (mentioned above) 
that there seems to be a pervasive lack of eagerness to interpret the TBT 
Agreement, would not seem that difficult. The TBT Agreement can be 
viewed as a logical continuation of GATT 1994, the former being ex-
pressly intended to further the objectives of the latter. Thus, much as the 
Appellate Body has elsewhere grounded analysis-completion on the 
finding of "a logical continuum," it might have proceeded (once it, 
unlike the panel, found the TBT Agreement applicable) to dispose of 
Canada's claim. 109 
108. This aspect of the French decree was examined at length by the panel, which so 
concluded. See its discussion, which precedes its conclusion, Asbestos Panel report, supra 
note 3, 'll'll 8.72-.73. 
109. The Appellate Body distinguished its "logical continuum" reasoning in Repon of 
the Appellate Body, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R 
(July 3D, 1997), http://www.wto.org, on the ground that, there, the second sentence of Article 
III:2 was "closely related" to the first sentence. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 
'll 79. The TBT Agreement as it applies to asbestos products could also be said to be "closely 
related" to GATT 1994 Anicle XX(b). The term "necessary" in the latter involves the same 
thought as avoiding "unnecessary obstacles" in § 2.2 of the former; and the wording of the 
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The Appellate Body had analyzed Article XX(b) at length and had 
affirmed the panel's rejection, under Article XX(b), of Canada's princi-
pal claim under GATT 1994. The Appellate Body had thus already laid 
the groundwork for rejecting, for substantially the same reason, Can-
ada's claim under the TBT Agreement. As mentioned above, one of the 
recitals of the TBT Agreement tracks Article XX(b), including the lan-
guage on measures necessary to protect human life or health. It therefore 
would not seem to have required a very demanding exercise in analysis-
completion for the Appellate Body to have extended its discussion of 
Article XX(b) and the principal Canadian claim under GATT 1994, to 
have caused that discussion to embrace the Canadian claim under the 
TBT Agreement, and on that basis to have dismissed that claim as well. 
If the Appellate Body (overcoming a seeming institutional allergy to 
construing the TBT Agreement) had taken this step, it could have implic-
itly provided a further indication that the panel's basic views on the 
applicability of Article XX(b) were not altogether lacking in merit. That 
is, by indicating that the claim under the TBT Agreement could be prop-
erly disposed of under the aegis of Article XX(b) as carried over into the 
TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body would have built on the findings of 
the panel already endorsed by the Appellate Body with respect to Article 
XX(b), and would thereby have signaled that the basic issues of the As-
bestos case taken as a whole should have been dealt with under Article 
XX(b) as found in GATT 1994 or as effectively incorporated in the TBT 
Agreement. llo So doing, the Appellate Body would have established a 
salutary bridge between its own report and that of the panel and would 
have added constructively to WTO jurisprudence serving as a guide to 
future panels. 
CONCLUSION 
The uneasy relationship between panels and the Appellate Body is in 
need of attention, and the Appellate Body is well-situated to provide that 
attention. The objective should be to improve the quality of WTO dis-
pute settlement. More constructive use should be made of the reasoning 
and substantive content of panel reports. Less institutional time (fewer 
precious institutional resources) should be devoted to revision engaged 
in for purposes that do not advance the resolution of the case at hand or 
introductory clause of Article XX and of the sixth recital of the TBT Agreement are substan-
tially identical. 
110. See Professor Robert L. Howse, Application for Leave to File a Written Brief in the 
Matter of European Communities-Asbestos 3 (Nov. 10, 2000) (commenting on the TBT 
Agreement and Article XX(b) of GATT 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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the development of a useful jurisprudential framework for future cases. 111 
That is, cases should be viewed in a rigorously disciplined manner as 
embodying individual disputes in need of proper resolution and, where 
appropriate, as tools for building useful precedent for future cases. When 
critics of the WTO process are in the background of a case, their criti-
cism should be viewed as an opportunity to defend the process not by 
distorting it but by using it for the production of well-reasoned reports of 
the highest quality, solidly grounded in the relevant WTO agreements. 
The panel and Appellate Body reports in the Asbestos case can serve 
as constructive examples of how a more effective relationship might ex-
ist between panels and the Appellate Body. The Asbestos panel first met 
with the parties in June 1999, and it met with the parties and with scien-
tific experts at various times thereafter. It issued a preliminary report in 
June and a final report in July 2000, which was distributed in September 
of that year. The report is 517 single-spaced pages long, to which is at-
tached an addendum of over 200 pages. 112 These data constitute at least 
some evidence that the work of the panel was serious and substantial. At 
a minimum, the panel not only disposed of the issues but also framed 
them for the Appellate Body and provided a detailed background against 
which to consider the points raised on appeal. In November and Decem-
ber 2000, the parties filed their submissions with the Appellate Body, 
which heard oral argument in January 2001 and issued its report (71 
double-spaced pages) in March of that year. 
At issue was a French decree designed to protect the public from a 
known carcinogen, chrysotile asbestos. The panel report reveals the 
panel's perception that the Canadian challenge to this decree should be 
resolved under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994, which expressly covers 
measures necessary to protect human life and health. The panel in fact 
proceeded to dispose of the case under Article XX(b), and ruled in favor 
of the defending party (the EU acting on behalf of France). While the 
panel heard a great many arguments and a great deal of expert testimony, 
and wrote up the results of these hearings in some detail in its report, its 
reasoning was economical and to the point: it asked whether the decree 
at issue met the requirements of Article XX(b), it concluded that it did, 
and it ruled in favor of the defending party. 
This presented the Appellate Body with an opportunity to deal with 
the case in an even more economical fashion, inasmuch as the panel had 
already evaluated the testimony and laid the groundwork for an appellate 
Ill. In this connection, see Harrowsmith, supra note 8, at 115. 
112. Over half of these pages were devoted to the risk posed by asbestos products to 
human life or health (see supra note 67), that is, to the central subject-matter being considered 
under Article XX(b). 
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affirmation in the event that (as it turned out) the Appellate Body agreed 
with the panel that the French decree was justified (could be upheld) un-
der Article XX(b). The Appellate Body permitted itself, however, to get 
caught up in a dispute over the "likeness" of asbestos products and sub-
stitute products under Article 1II:4. To some extent, the Article III:4 issue 
had to be disposed of, because the parties had re-raised it on appeal. In 
this posture, however, since the Appellate Body agreed with the panel as 
to Article XX(b), the re-raising of Article III:4 should have been viewed 
by the Appellate Body for what it was, that is, as nothing more than pre-
cautionary maneuvering by the EU (and by Canada in response to the 
EU), lest the Appellate Body reverse the panel with respect to Article 
XX(b). Once the Appellate Body had decided to affirm the panel with 
respect to Article XX(b), it was in a position to avoid entanglement in 
the argument over "likeness" and to state that, in view of the disposition 
of the case under Article XX(b), there was no need to reach the question 
of "likeness" under Article 1II:4. 
It is unclear to what extent this "unlikeness" dispute under Article 
1II:4 may have been the result of disagreements within the Appellate 
Body or the AB Division itself, and to what extent it may have been in-
fluenced by outside groups dissatisfied that, in their view, the panel had 
imposed an undue burden of proof on the EU in its defense of the French 
decree. As regards the latter possible influence, the Appellate Body in 
the Asbestos case established procedures for the submission of briefs to 
it by non-governmental organizations. In response, seventeen applica-
tions for leave to file written briefs were submitted, none of which was 
accepted by the Appellate Body.ll) 
Of course, in taking on the "likeness" dispute, the Appellate Body 
could have been motivated by reasons relating to the larger picture of 
WTO jurisprudence. When so motivated, however, the Appellate Body 
would be well advised to hold itself to a simple test: is it turning out a 
decision which clarifies existing jurisprudence and will serve as a useful 
guide to future panels? In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body did not 
rise to the standard implicit in that test. Two members of the AB Divi-
sion suggested an analytical approach that was not clearly supported by 
the evidence in the panel report, and which might not be supported by 
the evidence were the matter to be retried in light of the Appellate 
Body's report. The third member of the AB Division sought to extend 
the concept of "likeness" in a manner which, if adopted, could compli-
cate the resolution of future cases. 
The analysis suggested by two members of the AB Division is that 
carcinogenic properties render products with those properties (here, as-
113. See Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, '11'11 54-57. 
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bestos products) less competitive than products without those properties 
(here, substitute products). The evidence in the case did not support this 
analysis, and it may be factually unsupportable. In the absence of posi-
tive law like the French decree, the marketplace may be quite receptive 
to carcinogenic products even when competitive non-carcinogenic prod-
ucts are available. The Appellate Body did little for the stature of WTO 
jurisprudence by engaging in dubious analysis in order to reverse the 
panel as to "likeness." 
The conclusion suggested by the third member of the AB Division 
was to the effect that the comparative consequences for human life and 
health should be a criterion for judging the "likeness" of products under 
Article 1II:4. Noble as this thought may be, it is not good law. The con-
cept of "like products" in Article III is not a catch-all for every policy 
distinction that might be advanced for the purpose of showing one cate-
gory of product "unlike" another. Article III: 1 sets out the economic 
purpose of Article III by stating that domestic measures "should not be 
applied so as to afford protection to domestic production." Ad Article III 
(2), taking Article III to its widest scope, refers to "a directly competitive 
or substitutable product." The prohibition, then, is not against products 
that are carcinogenic or otherwise harmful, but against measures that are 
trade-protectionist. When it comes to carcinogens, the relevant prohibi-
tion (as indicated by the panel and affirmed by the Appellate Body) is 
found in Article XX(b). 
There may have been some reluctance on the part of the Appellate 
Body to rely solely on Article XX(b) in view of the protests of some 
health and environmental groups following the issuance of the panel re-
port, and their professed concerns over the burden of proof borne by the 
EU (on behalf of France) in respect of Article XX(b). The burden was 
twofold: the EU had to show that the French decree was "necessary" to 
protect human life or health; and the EU had to show that it met the con-
ditions found in the introductory clause of Article XX (forbidding 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, and disguised barriers to trade). 
These requirements are not inherently hostile to measures designed to 
protect human life or health. They are hostile, rather, to measures that, 
on the pretext of protecting human life or health, further a policy of trade 
protectionism. In this respect, Article XX(b) is of a piece with the true 
focus of Article III, namely, the prohibition of measures designed for 
trade-protectionist purposes. 
The balance struck in Article XX(b) may not please everyone, 
although, properly understood (as it may not be by some advocates of 
non-trade policies), it may in fact please a very large number of 
constituencies. Changing or circumventing Article XX(b) is bound to 
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displease certain constituencies, such as developing countries suspicious 
of measures advocated by industrialized countries to protect health, the 
environment, or labor standards. In any event, this debate is not one that 
can be resolved in the context of WTO dispute resolution, and it is to be 
hoped that the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case was not so iII-
advised as to think that it was making a contribution to this debate. 
Rather, it would have made a helpful contribution had it, in affirming the 
panel as to Article XX(b), offered an explanation of the reasons 
underlying and policies served by that provision. 
The uneasy relationship between panels and the Appellate Body 
does not facilitate judicial economy within the WTO and adversely af-
fects the quality of its work in resolving disputes. Panels should be 
brought more closely and effectively into the dispute-resolution process. 
The Appellate Body should provide leadership to this end by fostering a 
judicious use of resources within the WTO dispute-settlement apparatus, 
by minimizing unnecessary digressions from the economical disposition 
of cases, and by consciously developing a workable framework of deci-
sions of utility to panels and itself in the future. 
